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Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought
Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
Preston Werner
Non-naturalism is the view that normative properties are response-
independent, irreducible to natural properties, and causally inefficacious.¹
Sharon Street and Richard Joyce, by arguing that a non-naturalism entails
skepticism, have ushered in a virtually insurmountable literature on non-
naturalist moral epistemology and evolutionary debunking arguments.²
These concerns are not new.³ Extensions of the so-called “Benacerraf
problem” for mathematical entities to the moral realm have also attempted
to undermine non-naturalism.⁴ And there remains no consensus on how—
or whether—these epistemological challenges can be met.
A less discussed question for non-naturalism concerns the metasemantic
connection between normative beliefs and the normative facts. This under-
explored question concerns the metasemantics of normative terms. Ideally,
the non-naturalist could remain ecumenical. As has been noted, however,
this is not possible.⁵ So the challenge is for the non-naturalist to find some
independently motivated metasemantic view that fits well with non-
naturalism. Let’s call this challenge—which is developed in more detail
below—the metasemantic challenge.
The widely discussed epistemological challenges and the metasemantic
challenge are at least superficially related. They both raise questions about
the status of our normative beliefs if non-naturalism is true. Epistemological
challengers argue that non-naturalism threatens to make all normative
beliefs unjustified. Metasemantic challengers argue that non-naturalism
¹ Ridge (2014). ² Joyce (2001, 2006), Street (2006).
³ See e.g. Ruse and Wilson (1986).
⁴ See e.g. Benacerraf (1973), Harman (1977), Liggins (2010), Enoch (2011: ch. 7),
Clarke-Doane (2017).
⁵ Schroeter and Schroeter (2014), Suikkanen (2017).
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makes it impossible for us to have beliefs about normative properties and
facts at all, since it is impossible for our beliefs to fix onto non-natural
properties as their referent.
This chapter focuses on the second challenge. My suggestion is that non-
naturalists endorse an epistemic account of reference determination of the
sort recently defended by Imogen Dickie, with some modifications.⁶ An
important implication of this account is that, if correct, a fully fleshed out
moral epistemology will simultaneously rebut metasemantic objections to
non-naturalism. Thus, the two challenges in effect amount to one.
In section 7.1, I recap two influential epistemological challenges to non-
naturalism, as well as the less discussed metasemantic challenge. In section
7.2, I first review a few standard metasemantic theories, illustrating why
they spell trouble for the non-naturalist (7.2.1–7.2.2). I then discuss Laura
Schroeter and François Schroeter’s “normative connectedness model” to see
whether it does any better; I conclude that it does not, and for reasons that
will generalize to any internalist metasemantics for non-naturalism
(7.2.3–7.2.4). In section 7.3, I assess whether the doctrine of reference
magnetism may supplement any of the previous accounts, especially given
that some recent work on metasemantics for moral realism has attempted to
make use of them for responding to a variety of objections. In section 7.4,
I develop my positive epistemic theory, which is well-suited to avoid all of
the problems with the traditional metasemantic theories when extended to
non-natural normative properties. Section 7.5 draws out three ways in
which the epistemic theory accords nicely with widely discussed features
of non-naturalism.
7.1 . EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METASEMANTIC
OBJECTIONS TO NON-NATURALISM
The so-called Benacerraf problem goes back at least to Paul Benacerraf ’s
(1973) “Mathematical Truth.”⁷ While Benacerraf was concerned with the
case of mathematical knowledge, a similar sort of problem arises for non-
naturalist moral realists, according to which moral properties are not caus-
ally efficacious.⁸ This parallel was first noticed by Gilbert Harman (1977).
As in the mathematical case, even while causal conditions on knowledge
⁶ Dickie (2015, 2016).
⁷ Field (1989), Cheyne (2001), and Liggins (2010) for discussions of this point and
developments of Benacerraf ’s problem.
⁸ E.g. Heathwood (2015: 3), McGrath (2014: 186), and Scanlon (2014). Oddie
(2005) is an exception to this general rule.
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have fallen out of favor, there is still a widespread sense that explaining our
epistemic access—in terms of responsiveness to the moral facts—is a serious
concern for the non-naturalist moral realist.
Another more specific sort of undercutting defeater for moral knowledge
comes in the form of evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). At the
most abstract level, the idea of an EDA is to provide a genealogy of our
moral beliefs or belief-forming mechanisms in terms of the fitness-
enhancing evolutionary nature of those beliefs or belief-forming mechan-
isms. Such an explanation, the debunker argues, will make no appeal to any
mind-independent moral facts. And the lack of explanation here strongly
suggests skepticism which serves to undercut any justification we initially
had about stance-independent moral facts.
I won’t say more about how the details of these arguments are best
worked out. Instead, let’s turn now to the metasemantic challenge. David
Enoch provides a concise statement of the problem:
[According to non-naturalists] the word “good” (to pick one example) refers—at
least in some of its occurrences—to the property goodness. And this property is, on
[non-naturalist views], causally inert and response-independent. How is it, then, that
our word manages to latch onto that property—rather than some other property, or
perhaps no property at all?⁹
We’ll consider more specific metasemantic theories in the next section. For
now, just notice the intuitive thought behind the worry. I have a cat named
Zooey. As a result, I have a bunch of beliefs about Zooey: that he’s lazy, has
a cute nose, is mean to other cats, etc. Somehow these beliefs all latch onto
Zooey, rather than my partner, other cats, or anything else.¹⁰ It’s the task of a
metasemantic theory to tell us exactly how this works. But whatever the
details are here, it’s intuitive that my Zooey-beliefs bear all sorts of relations
to Zooey that don’t appear to hold in the normative case, if non-naturalism is
true. Zooey is frequently part of my perceptual experiences, there is a causal
chain between my Zooey-beliefs and Zooey, my linguistic community’s
patterns of “Zooey”-tokenings converge on Zooey. But it is unclear that
any of these sorts of relations hold (or even could hold) between our
normative beliefs and any non-natural properties. So there is a prima facie
metasemantic challenge for non-naturalists. And this prima-facie challenge is
made more formidable by noting that many mainstream metasemantic
theories make reference to non-natural properties (as they’re traditionally
construed, at least) not just challenging, but impossible.
⁹ Enoch (2011: 177).
¹⁰ I use italics, here and throughout, to refer to properties and objects in the world, as
opposed to words or concepts.
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One clarification is in order. Metasemantic theories are ambiguous
between two possible theoretical inquiries. First, a metasemantic theory
could be attempting to answer the question of how words latch onto
properties and objects. Second, a metasemantic theory could be attempting
to answer the question of how concepts—that is, psychological
representations—latch onto properties and objects. The metasemantic chal-
lenge to non-naturalism has been framed both ways, without clear differen-
tiation.¹¹ I will be speaking in terms of mental content and psychological
concepts in what follows. All of what I say could in principle be extended to
linguistic content as well.
7 .2 . NON-NATURALISM AND TRADITIONAL
METASEMANTICS
Three popular families of metasemantic views are (a) causal/teleological
theories, (b) conceptual role semantics, and (c) neo-descriptivism. I briefly
explain why these traditional views are not promising for the non-naturalist
(7.2.1–7.2.2), before discussing Schroeter and Schroeter’s “connectedness”
model in more detail (7.2.3–7.2.4).
7.2.1. Causal and Teleological Theories and Non-Naturalism
Causal theories of content all share a commitment to the thesis that concepts
get their content in virtue of some causal relation(s) that hold between
tokenings of the concept and some property, object, or individual in the
world. More formulaically:
SCT: For any concept C and any property F, C refers to F iff
tokenings of C tend to be caused by F.
SCT is open to interpretation between a range of different causal relation-
ships. However, none of these details need to be considered for the present
purpose. Any causal theory of content will be a non-starter for the non-
naturalist, since the non-naturalist denies that normative properties are
causally efficacious. In fact, the causal theory of content has been exploited
by naturalist moral realists to ensure that the moral terms pick out natural
(causally efficacious) properties.¹² We can set aside causal theories of all
¹¹ See e.g. Wedgwood (2007), Enoch (2011) (and the quote above), and Schroeter
and Schroeter (forthcoming).
¹² Boyd (1988, 2003), Sturgeon (1998).
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types—they will not provide a non-naturalist-friendly metasemantics with-
out radical alteration in the commitments of non-naturalists.
Close cousins of causal theories of content, teleological theories, are in
principle better placed to avoid the above incompatibility with non-
naturalism. On teleological theories, “what a representation represents
depends on the functions of the systems that produce or use the represen-
tation.”¹³ “Function” here is understood in terms of what the particular state
or process was selected for. So, for example, a given concept C refers to
poutine just in case (and because) it was selected for the advancement of my
broader psychological systems’ poutine-related goals.
Unlike with causal theories, functions need not refer to causally effica-
cious properties. For example, evolution selects for creatures who are able to
grasp mathematical concepts such as addition and division. These concepts
play a certain function in allowing us to reason in a variety of ways that
increase our survivability. So far so good for the non-naturalist. But despite
the slight improvement on causal theories, non-naturalists—or at least the
vast majority of non-naturalists—should still reject a teleological metase-
mantics for normative concepts. To see why, consider how the teleologist
will determine the content of a given normative concept. In order to answer
this question, the teleologist will look at what best explains the function of
normative thoughts. Neil Sinclair (2012) has perhaps done the most to flesh
out what a teleosemantics might look like for normative thoughts.¹⁴
Sinclair argues that moral concepts have an evolutionary function, which
is to coordinate interpersonal behavior.¹⁵ On this sort of story, morality
evolves in order to solve certain pervasive evolutionary bargaining problems.
It should already be clear that this story about the function of our moral
concepts, and any similar such story, will be incompatible with non-
naturalism. Supposing Sinclair’s story is right, the function of moral con-
cepts is to encourage certain fitness-enhancing behavior. A behavior’s being
(or not being) fitness enhancing is surely a natural property. For this reason,
it is unsurprising that no non-naturalists have appealed to teleosemantics in
their metasemantic theorizing.¹⁶
¹³ Neander (2012: introduction).
¹⁴ Of course teleologists have discussed weaker notions of normativity for a very long
time (see e.g. Millikan 1984, and esp. Millikan 1995). I hope the difference between a
normative thought related to an organism’s survival and a robustly moral thought is clear
enough. Certain kinds of naturalists won’t see a difference in kind between these two
notions of normativity, but rather a difference of degree. But we can set this aside, since
the present chapter is only concerned with non-naturalists.
¹⁵ But see also Millikan 1995: section 5) for a relevant precursor.
¹⁶ Notice here that this forecloses a strategy analogous to third-factor responses to
epistemological objections to non-naturalism. Showing a co-extension between the
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7.2.2. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics for normative terms has received the most
discussion in the metaethical literature, largely because of Ralph Wedg-
wood’s influential book The Nature of Normativity, as well as his subsequent
work.¹⁷ The basic idea is explained concisely by Laura Schroeter and
Francois Schroeter:
Like expressivists, Wedgwood thinks the open question argument suggests that the
central element in the meaning of moral terms is their action-guiding role. Indeed,
according toWedgwood, grasping the action-guiding role of those terms is all there is
to understanding their meaning. But Wedgwood embraces cognitivism: he thinks
that the conceptual role of moral terms provides the resources to single out genuine
properties as their semantic value . . . the action-guiding role of moral terms, he
suggests, suffices to determine which property they pick out.¹⁸
Wedgwood takes the following to be a conceptual truth:
(1) Necessarily, if one is rational, then, if one judges “I ought to ɸ,”
one also intends to ɸ.
As a conceptual truth, anyone with a full grasp of OUGHT is in a position
to know (1). More importantly, though, anyone with a full grasp of
OUGHT will be disposed to make the relevant transitions from ought-
judgments to intentions, whether implicitly or explicitly. So this ensures, at
the very least, that OUGHT is connected up with an action-guiding
property. But this is not yet enough to connect OUGHT up with a non-
natural property, much less the correct one. It only shows that there is a
certain relationship between “ought” judgments and intentions to act.
Somehow it must be the case that this action-guiding concept connects up
with a non-natural property, if Wedgwood’s story is to vindicate a non-
naturalist metaethics.
A conceptual role semantics for non-natural properties must connect our
concepts not just to the prescriptive role of the properties, but also their
representational role. We can see this by considering an agent, Anya, who
has some concept O*. O* meets the conditions of (1). Whenever Anya
judges that she O* to ɸ, and she is rational, she forms the intention to ɸ.
But furthermore, suppose that the evidence that Anya relies on to form her
O* judgments are facts about causing as much pain and suffering to bunnies
properties our concepts evolved to track and the non-natural properties does not secure
reference onto the non-natural.
¹⁷ Wedgwood (2007).
¹⁸ Schroeter and Schroeter (2003: 191).
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as possible. Anya may even take the following to be a conceptual truth—or
at least something of a platitude:
(2) Necessarily, if an action ɸ would result in more pain to bunnies
than any alternative action, then I O* to ɸ.
We can call (2) the “Input” condition for O*,¹⁹ and (1) the “output”
condition. Anya’s O* is perfectly coherent, but surely we don’t want to
say that O* picks out the non-natural property of oughtness, unless we’re
gravely mistaken about what our obligations are.
But it’s not just that Anya’s concept is normatively problematic. Rather,
it’s that (1) radically underdetermines the relevant property picked out by
our OUGHT concept. As Neil Sinclair (2018) points out in a closely related
context, “it is implausible to suppose that a concept refers to a worldly
property when competence with that concept is compatible with no dispos-
ition whatsoever to be sensitive to any worldly property.”²⁰ The conceptual
role semanticist must provide—or at least gesture toward—what I’m calling
an input condition on our normative concepts. An input condition is one’s
disposition to apply the concept in appropriate circumstances. (For
example, the input condition for MODUS PONENS will be premises of
the form {P, P!Q}.) And this input condition must be close enough to
uniform across agents such that the OUGHT concept is shared amongst all
competent users of the concept (lest we collapse into relativism).²¹
7.2.3. Neo-Descriptivism, Connectedness,
and Non-Naturalism
Descriptivist theories all share the core idea that a concept gets its content by
its association with a set of application conditions, which are shared by any
competent user of the concept. Call internalist any view such that the
extension of a given concept for a given agent is determined wholly by
(actual or counterfactual) mental states of the agent. The latter feature of
descriptivism—that competent users must grasp the application conditions
associated with a concept—renders descriptivist theories paradigmatically
internalist. Notice that internalism should be initially attractive to the non-
naturalist. This is because it allows the normativity of our normative
concepts to be built into their meanings. If, as non-naturalists think,
¹⁹ In the Conceptual Role Semantics for logical operators, what I’m calling the input
condition is commonly called the introduction rule.
²⁰ Sinclair (2018: 113).
²¹ For compelling arguments distinct from (but related to) the argument of this
paragraph, see Lenman (2010).
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normative concepts refer to genuinely normative properties or nothing, then
we don’t have to worry about our normative concepts fixing onto properties
which are intuitively not action-guiding.
As is widely known, traditional descriptivist theories have serious prob-
lems. So let’s just consider the neo-descriptivist theories that evolved
to avoid these problems. The key strategy here is to make use of
idealization—a subject’s concept refers to the property she would pick
out once suitably idealized with respect to some relevant set of facts. Neo-
descriptivist theories like this have made some appearances in the me-
taethical literature, most notably perhaps in Jackson and Pettit’s (1995)
naturalist-friendly “moral functionalism.” Perhaps the most sophisticated
version of this kind of view is Schroeter and Schroeter’s “normative
connectedness model.”²² Because this latter model is the most plausible
neo-descriptivist theory for non-naturalists, and because the objection
I give below will apply to any neo-descriptivist view that makes use of
idealization, I will speak in terms of the normative connectedness model
for simplicity.
The theory that Schroeter and Schroeter propose to match their connect-
edness model attempts to shore up the problems with both neo-descriptivist
and teleological theories by moving to a fundamentally relational account.
As they summarize it:
The connectedness model relies on a tradition-based [metasemantic] theory: the
fundamental units to which semantic values are assigned are not token elements of
thought considered in isolation . . . but rather an entire representational tradition . . .
On this approach, the metasemantic theory seeks to assign a univocal semantic value
to the tradition as a whole, taking into account the understanding, environment, and
history of the entire diachronic and interpersonal tradition. Token elements of
thought then inherit their semantic values from the traditions to which they are
bound.²³
A token element of thought inherits its semantic value from its whole
historical and social use. This captures the idea that a concept’s meaning
in one person’s mouth should have a lot in common with previous uses of
the concept and provides a check on a more radical semantic internalism.
How, then, does the tradition help to determine the referent of some
particular concept? Here is what Schroeter and Schroeter say:
[T]he idea that the semantic value of normative concepts is fixed by some original
baptismal event is highly implausible . . . The correct principles . . . are simply an
²² Schroeter and Schroeter (2014).
²³ Schroeter and Schroeter (2014: 12). They use “determination theory” for what I’m
calling a metasemantic theory.
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idealization of a subject’s own reflective methods for refining her understanding of
the precise subject matter of her words and thoughts . . . In effect, we can build our
[metasemantic] theory from the first-person reflective epistemology of the topic in
question.²⁴
The difference between the normative connectedness model and traditional
neo-descriptivism is that the idealization process includes information about
the tokenings of the concept that the subject will count as tokenings of the
very same concept that the subject sees herself as using. (This is the sense in
which the metasemantic theory takes the semantic tradition as prior or at
least essential to the determination of the concept’s referent.) This provides
a non-trivial restriction on an idealized subject’s assessment of the referent of
a given concept. Her assessment cannot be chauvinistic in the sense that her
conceptual tradition was so radically epistemically and reflectively mistaken
that their use of the concept was inherently defective. The idealized subject
is then given constraints on her interpretation of the concept that are not
present in other neo-descriptivist theories.
7.2.4. Neo-Descriptivism, Connectedness,
and a General Lesson
Whatever the strengths of the normative connectedness model, and neo-
descriptivist models more generally, the idealization strategy will fall into a
principled problem for non-naturalists, or at least the vast majority of them.
To see why, first notice that non-naturalists accept:
Metaphysical Autonomy. The normative facts are irreducible to the
natural facts, in the sense that there is no conceptual entailment or
complete metaphysical explanation from the natural facts to the nor-
mative facts.
Metaphysical Autonomy is a way of cashing out the irreducibility claim that
is so central to non-naturalism.²⁵ It is arguably closely related to Moore’s
open question argument²⁶ and Hume’s is–ought gap,²⁷ as well as to the
supervenience objection to non-naturalism.²⁸ Importantly for our purposes,
the Metaphysical Autonomy implies the following:
²⁴ Schroeter and Schroeter (2014: 13–14).
²⁵ Thanks to Aaron Elliott for helpful conversation on how to frame Metaphysical
Autonomy.
²⁶ Moore (1903). ²⁷ Hume (1975).
²⁸ Blackburn (1984), McPherson (2012), Elliott (2014).
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Epistemological Autonomy. An agent could be wholly procedurally
rational and fully informed about all the natural facts and yet ignorant
or mistaken about the normative.²⁹
Given the lack of an entailment relation between two domains, it should be
clear that knowledge of one domain is not guaranteed to improve knowledge
of the other. In practice, this may seem puzzling—of course gathering more
information about the natural facts assists us in drawing new and improved
normative conclusions! But notice that this sort of knowledge will always be
inferred from some purely normative claim, such as that suffering is bad.
This is really just a lesson of Hume’s is–ought argument reiterated.
Given the autonomy theses, we can show that the normative connected-
ness model and neo-descriptivist theories more generally face a dilemma.
We need a story about what facts get fed into the idealization process. Either
this idealization process will include the normative information or it will
not. Notice that this idealization process must meet two constraints. First,
the information in question should remove any ignorance about the infor-
mation relevant to determining the concept’s referent. This information is
relevant because it is required to illustrate the ways that non-idealized
agents’ concepts can refer to a determinant property even in light of
ignorance, in virtue of the fact that their concepts would fix on these
properties once ignorance is eliminated. This can ensure that a subject’s
WATER concept refers to H2O, even if her non-idealized self is disposed to
mistake XYZ for H2O. Her concept refers to H2O just in case she would
retract her judgments that instances of XYZ fall under her WATER concept
under idealization. Second, the information included in the idealization
process cannot make reference to the referents of the concept in question, on
pain of circularity. So, for example, idealizing for determining the semantic
value of WATER should not include facts about water (qua water), but
merely facts about the distribution of clear potable liquids that fill the lakes
and rivers, etc. Without this, the idealization process is just smuggling in the
fact that water is the semantic value of WATER, which is circular.
So first consider an idealization process which doesn’t include normative
information. On this view, we feed into our idealization an ideal base-level
description of all of the natural facts. While such an ideal base-level descrip-
tion will plausibly ensure a referent for natural properties, such a story won’t
work for normative properties considered as non-natural. When it comes to
²⁹ As Hille Paakkunainen pointed out to me, on some views of what it takes to grasp
the normative concepts, Metaphysical Autonomy is compatible with the rejection of
Epistemological Autonomy (Setiya 2012). I think these views have their own problems,
but such a discussion would take us outside of the scope of this chapter, so I set them
aside.
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a property whose truth conditions are not grounded in an ideal base-level
description of the physical world, an idealization with respect to these facts
will not remove any ignorance present in the non-idealized agent, and so
won’t fix the concept onto a determinant property. And Metaphysical
Autonomy entails that an ideal base-level description of the physical world
will not (alone) determine the truth of normative facts. As such, given that
the idealization base does not include any normative bridge laws, even
wholly rational agents with full information about the physical world are
not guaranteed to fix on a unique non-natural fact. Theories that rely on
idealization of this sort—including neo-descriptivism and the connected-
ness theory—will all fail for this reason. Schroeter and Schroeter’s theory
of de jure sameness may be able to show that a certain set of token instances
of a concept all refer to the same normative property (if they refer at all),
but it will leave open the question of which property is the concept’s
semantic value.
This objection suggests a very natural reply. The notion of an ideal base-
level description need not be restricted to a description of only physical facts.
Such an understanding of what the ideal base-level description of the world
would look like is only motivated by a pre-existing commitment to physic-
alism (the claim that all facts are reducible to physical facts). Furthermore,
there is precedent for understanding the ideal base-level description as
more than just physical facts. For example, property dualists would
want to add phenomenological facts to the ideal base-level description.³⁰
So for the property dualist, fixing the semantic value of the concept of
PHENOMENAL-RED requires acquaintance with a certain phenomeno-
logical fact, and so acquaintance with such a fact will be part of the ideal
base-level description. So, it may be argued, the non-naturalist should
embrace the same sort of strategy. The strategy involves including what
I’ll call “base-level normative” facts in the ideal base-level description of the
world. Thus, idealized agents would have access to the information they
need to fully determine the referents of their normative concepts.
A worry about this approach can be seen from considering exactly
how this set of “base-level normative facts” might look. An obvious place
to look is at the normative facts that metaethicists have argued are funda-
mental. One influential position in this literature is that reasons are the
fundamental normative kind, and thus all other normative truths are
grounded in reasons facts.³¹ Others have argued that it is not reasons but
some other set of normative facts that are fundamental, but nothing I’ll say
³⁰ See e.g. Chalmers (2012: ch. 3). ³¹ See e.g. Scanlon (2014).
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in what follows depends on which position is right.³² I speak in terms of
reasons for simplicity.
Suppose the base-level normative facts are just the facts about reasons
described using the agent’s concept of REASON. Since the semantic value
of the concept REASON is one of the very things we need a metasemantic
theory to fix, building up the base-level normative facts from claims that
involve the concept of REASON would result in obvious circularity. What’s
required for idealization to work for the non-naturalist is some way of
understanding a base-level description of the normative facts that doesn’t
invoke one of the very concepts it’s intended to illuminate. And it’s unclear
how to do so.
I don’t deny that some way of characterizing a base-level description of
normative information could avoid this problem. Notice that there is a
parallel here in the case of natural facts. We will need a metasemantic theory
of the concepts that figure in the base-level description of the physical world
as well. At this point, one could go externalist, or perhaps one could
interdefine a cluster of fundamental base-level concepts and then Ramsify
over those concepts. However this might work in the case of natural facts, it
won’t work in the normative case.³³ I haven’t given an argument to illustrate
that avoiding this problem is impossible. But it appears to be a serious
problem. What the non-naturalist needs, then, is either a solution to this
problem, or an alternative metasemantic theory that avoids this problem as
well as the problems for the other theories given above.
7 .3 . REFERENCE MAGNETS TO THE RESCUE?
Before turning to my positive proposal, it’s worth briefly discussing refer-
ence magnets, which have a rich history of solving (or purporting to solve)
metasemantic problems.³⁴ More specifically, several metaethicists have also
made use of reference magnets to make theoretical progress.³⁵ The central
theoretical role that reference magnets are supposed to play is to constrain
reference in cases of (sometimes radical) underdetermination. Suppose a
theory of reference entails that a particular concept has multiple eligible
referents. A theory of reference may entail, for example, the facts don’t
decide between greenness and grueness as the referent of GREEN. Reference
magnets provide a further constraint on reference to eliminate all but one
³² See e.g. McHugh and Way (2016), Howard (forthcoming).
³³ See section 7.3 for discussion of this point.
³⁴ Merrill (1980), Lewis, (1984), Sider (2011).
³⁵ Suikkanen (2017), van Roojen (2006), Dunaway and McPherson (2016).
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property as the eligible referent for a given concept and set of reference-
fixing facts. In this way, reference magnets are, as Ted Sider points out,³⁶ a
further constraint on reference fixing: Reference magnetism is not a theory
of reference itself, but a doctrine that can be (and perhaps must be) coupled
with any theory of reference you have independently motivated.
Just how do reference magnets function to take in multiple eligible
referents and output one eligible referent? As Lewis explains:
This constraint looks not to the speech and thought of those who refer, and not to
their causal connections to the world, but rather to the referents themselves. Among
the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, gerryman-
dered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so that their
boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in nature. Only these
elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents.³⁷
Lewis then weakens his claim a bit by allowing for matters of degree of
eligibility of reference.³⁸ Others have followed this line of thought. What is
important for our purposes is that, of the multiple eligible referents deter-
mined for a given concept in a given theory of reference, the doctrine of
reference magnetism then kicks in to fix the concept onto the most funda-
mental, joint-carving referent that is eligible.
In order for reference magnets to assist the non-naturalist, we first need a
theory of reference that latches onto at least some eligible non-natural
properties. If the theory of reference designates no eligible referents, then
reference magnets have no set of eligible referents to pare down. It’s crucial,
then, that the theory of reference the non-naturalist is supplementing with
reference magnets already targets non-natural properties as eligible referents.
This rules out the causal and teleological theories, since these theories don’t
target any non-natural properties as eligible referents. A more plausible
candidate theory here may be a conceptual role semantics, in which we
take the cluster of inferential relations between the normative concepts and
Ramsify over them.³⁹On such a theory, the set—or some relevant subset—
of the normative concepts is interdefined, and then reference magnets do the
work to attach them onto the relevantly isomorphic joint-carving non-
natural properties.
I concede that such a view could provide a positive metasemantics for the
non-naturalist. However, it comes at a cost which, other things equal, we
³⁶ Sider (2011: section 3.2).
³⁷ Lewis (1984: 227). Lewis credits the idea to Merrill (1980).
³⁸ Lewis (1984: 227–8).
³⁹ This sort of proposal was suggested to me by Billy Dunaway, Caleb Perl, and Mark
Schroeder. It is also gestured at in passing by Jussi Suikkanen (2017: 20).
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should want to avoid. For notice that, in order for such a view to work, we
have to hope (or better: argue) that two things hold. First, we must hope
that all normative concepts can be interdefined in an asymmetric Ramsified
set. Ramsification requires asymmetry. Lewis himself implicitly concedes
this in his famous paper on Ramseyan Humility:
We have assumed that a true and complete final theory implicitly defines its
theoretical terms. That means that it must have a unique actual realization. Should
we worry about symmetries, for instance the symmetry between positive and
negative charge? No: even if positive and negative charge were exactly alike in their
nomological roles, it would still be true that negative charge is found in the outlying
parts of atoms hereabouts, and positive charge is found in the central parts.⁴⁰
As Lewis here assumes, symmetries will be problematic within a Ramseyan
sentence if they can’t be eliminated. But the worry is that we can’t be
confident that the distribution of the normative properties will be asym-
metric in the relevant sense, at least without some independent (and
presumably contentious) argument.⁴¹ Suppose, for example, that all nor-
mative concepts are reduced to GOODNESS and BADNESS. What would
make it the case that GOODNESS refers to goodness rather than badness?
Presumably, nothing more could do the work—the work that reference
magnets could do has run out. And the argument for an asymmetry ought
to be independent from the metasemantic considerations raised here—or
anyway, it seems to me that allowing metasemantic considerations to rule
out certain views about the structure and relationship between different
normative concepts is getting the inquiry backwards.
A second problem for the CRS + reference magnets view is that it assumes
an isomorphism between the distribution and relationships between the
normative concepts and the distribution and relationships between the
normative properties. Let’s say we generate a Ramsey sentence with norma-
tive concepts A, B, C, . . . N. Start first with distribution. Now suppose that
one of the concepts, C, is defective, in the sense that it fails to refer to any
normative property. Because all of the other concepts are, directly or
indirectly, defined partly in terms of C, this defectiveness bleeds into the
rest of the conceptual system, and so it’s unclear whether any of the concepts
continue to refer. Next turn to the relationships between the concepts.
Suppose it is part of the inter-definition of A and B that [if x is A, then x
⁴⁰ Lewis (2009: 207). Thanks to Ryan Doody and Daniel Wodak for discussion here.
⁴¹ As Zoë Johnson King suggested to me, thick concepts may be able to help, because
they can attach the valences to the relevant descriptive properties as a matter of conceptual
truth. I think this can’t work for reasons that Parfit (2011: section 90) points out, but
I can’t explore this issue here.
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is not B]. Further, suppose that there are no two properties that have all of
the other relations that A and B have but are also such that [if x is A, then x is
not B]. A and B are thus not isomorphic with any normative properties. So
they don’t clearly have referents.
It’s not clear how much of a problem this second problem is. Surely the
conceptual role semanticist should allow for some flexibility and error in a
conceptual system, compatible with its concepts having referents. But it is
not a trivial question to ask how much is acceptable, and whether we can be
confident that normative concepts rise above this bar. Perhaps this is where
reference magnets are supposed to help. However, it isn’t obvious that they
can—for recall that the role of reference magnets is only to fix onto one
reference from a set of eligible ones. So the conceptual role semanticist about
non-natural properties must be sure that her theory allows for enough
flexibility and error for our normative concepts to pick out the non-natural
properties as eligible referents. This challenge may be surmountable, but it is
not insignificant.
7 .4 . AN EPISTEMIC APPROACH
TO METASEMANTICS
Non-naturalism runs into problems for each of the traditional metasemantic
theories, as well as for the “connectedness” model. It seems that the non-
naturalist metasemanticist is in serious trouble. Without a plausible explan-
ation of how our moral thoughts could latch onto the non-natural, norma-
tive properties, non-naturalism faces a very serious metasemantic objection.
I now defend a positive metasemantic theory for non-naturalism, closely
related to Imogen Dickie’s “justification-based” theory of reference fixing.⁴²
To make clear that, despite being influenced by Dickie’s view, my view
involves important nuances. I will call the view below the epistemic theory of
content.
To motivate the epistemic theory, notice two central motivations for
externalist theories. First, they capture the intuitive thought that, if we are
able to think about some particular object or property, then we must bear
some kind of special relationship to the object/property in question. This is
important to avoid underdetermination problems. If I’m thinking about the
gray mug in my cabinet, there must be some relationship between me and
that mug that makes my thought fix on that mug rather than any of the
thousands of qualitatively identical mugs in the world. Second, the
⁴² Dickie (2015, 2016).
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connection that externalists posit as required for reference fixing explains
our intuitions about twin-earth cases. What explains the fact that Oscar’s
concept WATER refers to H2O, whereas Twin-Oscar’s refers to XYZ?
Externalist theories can provide this explanation easily.
As we saw above, it is these external-relational requirements that spell
trouble for non-naturalism. Standard non-naturalists reject the claim that
normative properties are causally efficacious, as well as the claim that
representing non-natural properties fulfills some evolutionary or individu-
alistic teleological function. But surely non-naturalists shouldn’t deny that
our moral thoughts bear some relationship to the non-natural normative
properties. Even setting aside the rough motivations for some kind of
externalist theory of content, non-naturalists should endorse the claim
that there is some relationship between our moral thoughts and the non-
natural normative properties in order to undergird justified moral beliefs or
moral knowledge. This relation could come in any number of forms,
depending on one’s favored non-naturalist moral epistemology.⁴³
These thoughts naturally suggest some kind of epistemic theory of
reference fixing. The rough idea is that a concept C refers to some property
F just in case the mode of justification for beliefs containing C non-luckily
converges on F. Such a theory, if it could be made to work, would capture
the intuitive motivations for externalist theories, but in a way that makes
reference to non-causal properties such as non-natural normative properties
in principle possible. This rough idea suggests two questions. First, can such
a theory be made to work? Second, given the difficulties faced for non-
naturalist moral epistemologists, is this really an improvement for the non-
naturalist metasemanticist? I address each question in turn.
Helpfully, a book-length defense of an affirmative answer to the first
question has been given by Imogen Dickie.⁴⁴ I cannot hope to recap the
entire argument of the book here. But, briefly, Dickie motivates her core
idea on the basis of two premises, which she calls Principle connecting
aboutness and truth and Principle connecting truth and justification:
Aboutness and Truth: “A thought about an object (a thought attrib-
uting a property to an object) is true iff the object has the property.”⁴⁵
Truth and Justification: “Justification is truth-conducive: in general,
and allowing exceptions, if a subject’s belief is justified, he or she will
be unlucky if the belief is not true and not merely lucky if it is.”⁴⁶
⁴³ Bengson (2015), Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) provide two such examples.
⁴⁴ Dickie (2015). ⁴⁵ Dickie (2015: 37).
⁴⁶ Dickie (2015: 38). This is Dickie’s approximate formulation of the principle, but
the precise details are outside the scope of this chapter.
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Aboutness and Truth should be relatively uncontroversial. Truth and Justifi-
cation is, perhaps, slightly more controversial, but not much. Even if
justification doesn’t aim at truth,⁴⁷ it is overwhelmingly plausible that,
when things are going well, justified beliefs are, in virtue of their justificatory
status, more likely to be true. I’ll assume that something like Truth and
Justification is correct in what follows.⁴⁸
These two relatively mundane principles entail, for reasons explained in
an appendix, a surprisingly interesting metasemantic thesis:
Aboutness and Justification: S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs are about an object iff
their means of justification converges on the object, so that, given how
the beliefs are justified, the subject will be unlucky if they do not
match the object and not merely lucky if they do.⁴⁹
First, a word about the notion of a “means of justification.” For Dickie, each
concept has a “proprietary means of justification.”⁵⁰ To see what this comes
to, imagine a case where there is conflict between two potential sources of
justification. You’re looking in the fridge and you see that there is a package
of tofu sitting on the shelf. You form the belief we have tofu in the house.
Your roommate then shouts from the other room “We are out of tofu!” You
now have testimonial evidence that conflicts with your perceptual evi-
dence.⁵¹ For Dickie, a proprietary means of justification is the means of
justification that you take—other things being equal—to trump in cases of
conflict. In a case where you are directly perceptually linked up with some
object, you will tend to take that to trump your testimonial evidence. But in
other cases, such as cases in which an object is very far away and you know
that your interlocutor is knowledgeable, testimonial evidence will trump
perceptual evidence. Whichever piece of evidence tends to trump for some
concept C will be C’s proprietary means of justification. And because of its
potential relevance to the moral case, notice that a means of justification
being proprietary does not entail that all or even that the majority of our
beliefs containing the concept make use that means of justification.
Here I want to briefly flag a worry about the notion of a proprietary
means of justification. It’s unclear to me, contra Dickie, that there are any
⁴⁷ Contra Cruz and Pollock (2004).
⁴⁸ Dickie (2015: section 2.1) has a much more sophisticated defense of this principle.
⁴⁹ Dickie (2015: 37). Again, this is Dickie’s approximate version of the principle.
⁵⁰ Dickie (2015: 50–7).
⁵¹ Notice too that beliefs using the concept in question will still have the same
reference even when they are formed using some non-proprietary means of justification.
The proprietary means fix the reference of a concept, but the concept can be constituents
of all sorts of beliefs that are not proprietary. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing
out the ambiguity here.
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such means of justification that will always serve the role of a proprietary
means of justification. That is, it seems that, with respect to the very same
concept, there will be contexts in which perceptual evidence will trump, and
contexts in which testimonial evidence will trump. So what are we to say
about such a case?
There are a number of options here. On the one I prefer, proprietary
means are fixed by what the fundamental mechanism of justification for
beliefs about C is. This means that, if testimonial evidence ultimately traces
back to the perceptual evidence of someone else, perception retains its status
as the proprietary means of justification.⁵² But rather than get bogged down
exploring this and the other options, I think it is worth noting that this is
arguably less of a worry for the moral case. Insofar as there is some source of
justification for moral beliefs (intuitions, rational insight, reflective equilib-
rium, etc.), it seems clear that this source will trump other sources, such as
testimony.⁵³ While I grant that this is a contentious claim, it would take
quite some time to defend. So instead, let me just grant that, if this idea of a
proprietary means of justification cannot be defended or revised, the epi-
stemic theory of content is in some trouble.
Return to Aboutness and Justification. This principle is not quite what the
non-naturalist metasemanticist needs, for two reasons. First, as stated, the
principle is about fixing reference for objects, not properties. But altering the
principle into one about properties is straightforward:
S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs are about a property iff the (proprietary) means of
justification converge on the property so that, given how the beliefs are
justified, the subject will be unlucky if they don’t track the property
and not merely lucky if they do.
The second problem is more substantive. Aboutness and Justification pro-
vides a biconditional relationship between a means of justification and the
referent of beliefs that the means of justification generates. It doesn’t yet give
us a complete metasemantic theory, since it doesn’t tell us whether it is the
means of justification that determines the referent or vice versa. And in fact,
Dickie argues that there is no priority here.⁵⁴
If the non-naturalist metasemanticist is going to use Aboutness and
Justification (or something like it) to make theoretical progress, it must be
that a particular means of justification fixes reference. Dickie rejects this
⁵² So e.g. this would entail that the proprietary means of justification for any math-
ematical belief is going to be a priori, whether or not I am disposed to defer to professional
mathematicians’ testimony over my own a priori reasoning.
⁵³ As skepticism about forming beliefs based on moral testimony may help to show.
⁵⁴ Dickie (2015: 3.5).
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position, on the grounds that “[o]ur grip of the kind of factor that justifies
beliefs seems to rest on our grip of the kind of factor that—in most, or
nearby, or, optimal circumstances—will result in formation of beliefs that are
true.”⁵⁵ In other words, it appears that our conception of justification will
ineliminably refer to modes of belief-formation that tend toward truth, in
which case we need a grip on the truth conditions, in which case we need to
know which objects and properties figure in the beliefs being formed before
we can determine the conditions on justification. Using a mode of justifi-
cation to fix reference won’t work, then: it helps itself to a concept’s referent,
the very thing it is attempting to explain.
This argument must fail: It proves too much. It generalizes far beyond
an epistemic theory of content determination. To see this, consider first a
prima-facie problem for the causal theory of reference. Any plausible theory
of reference better entail that your concept DOG refers to dogs. But, of
course, there are a number of circumstances in which your DOG concept
will be tokened by non-dog things: large cats, small horses in the distance,
stuffed dogs, and so on will often token your DOG concept. So the causal
theorist is going to have to say something about why DOG doesn’t pick out
dog-or-largecat-or-smallhorse-or-stuffeddog, but just dogs.⁵⁶ Causal theorists
have had a number of things to say about how to do this.⁵⁷ But what is most
important is that these ways do not, and need not, refer to the fact that
DOG refers to dogs. So, at least in principle, there is no circularity in solving
this problem. For similar reasons, we shouldn’t—at least without further
argument—assume that a story about a mode of justification must assume
the content of the justified beliefs that it feeds out.
It is true that the path here is harder to hoe, because justification is itself a
normative notion.⁵⁸ It will be hard to determine success conditions without
knowing what facts the means of justification attempt to track accurately.
But there is no reason to think this can’t be done. Notice that the situation is
structurally similar to the causal theorist’s. The causal theorist must give an
account to separate the causal conditions that determine content from those
that do not. And this account must not help itself to the content that is
being fixed. Similarly, the epistemic theorist must give an account to
separate the beliefs formed on the basis of the mode of justification in
⁵⁵ Dickie (2015: 111).
⁵⁶ This is a problem originally flagged by Fodor (1984).
⁵⁷ See Adams and Aizawa (2017: section 3) for an overview.
⁵⁸ However, note that there is no circularity in having a normative notion in the
metasemantic story. Unlike in the internalist case, we aren’t providing subjects with
the justification-facts in order to fix their reference for a concept like
JUSTIFICATION. (Thanks to Aaron Elliott for discussion here.)
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question that determine content from those that do not. She needs a theory
of which beliefs are epistemically unlucky, in the sense that they are justified
beliefs, but not ones that fix content. Once we set aside the epistemically
unlucky beliefs, we can determine the content of the belief in question by
seeing which object/property the non-lucky beliefs converge on.⁵⁹How can
the epistemic theorist distinguish the reference-fixing beliefs from those that
are merely unlucky? After all, it may seem that the most natural ways of
doing this will involve appealing to the content of the beliefs in question,
which the epistemic theorist can’t help herself to on pain of circularity.⁶⁰
While a full solution of this problem lies outside the scope of this chapter,
let me gesture at one that seems promising. (If this solution is ultimately
untenable, that’s ok—what is important is that this problem mirrors a
problem for any externalist metasemantics. So even a lack of a solution is
not in itself a reason to reject the epistemic theory proposed here.) Take
some proprietary means of justification, such as visual experience. Such a
mode plausibly has (or would on a fully worked out theory) a canonical list
of good conditions for justification-conferring uses of the mode—for
example, good lighting, being awake, sober, and so on. Notice that, if we
are careful, nothing on this list will itself appeal to the content of what is
seen. When and only when a visual experience meets the conditions on the
list, it will count as a reference-fixing instance for the concepts being
deployed in the downstream belief(s). Now this won’t be quite enough,
because even under good conditions, visual experiences can get things
wrong. So there will remain some prima-facie reference-fixing beliefs that
are nonetheless intuitively false. This requires, perhaps, some further modal
condition: The token belief will count as reference-fixing just in case (a) it
was formed in good conditions for its proprietary means of justification, and
(b) it isn’t the result of an “epistemically” deviant chain.⁶¹ A similar story
could be told for any proprietary means of justification.
Let’s walk through how our normative concepts could fix onto non-
natural properties, according to the epistemic theory of content. Imagine a
toy non-naturalist epistemology, rational insight. (It won’t matter how this
gets fleshed out, so the reader should imagine this mechanism however she
so desires.) On such a view, agents form their (pure) moral beliefs on the
⁵⁹ If they converge on nothing, then the concept is defective in some way. What to say
about defective concepts is a vexed matter that I can’t address here. But notice that the
possibility of a concept’s being defective is a positive feature of the epistemic theory.
Surely any theory of reference fixing should allow for and explain the possibility of
defective concepts.
⁶⁰ I thank Joshua Schechter for pressing me to say more here.
⁶¹ I take it that whatever gets said about what makes a causal chain deviant could also
be said about epistemically deviant chains (some of which are surely causal).
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basis of rational insight. When things go well, and the canonical conditions
for this means of justification are met, rational insight converges on the facts
about normative properties. An agent can’t—at least non-luckily—form
justified beliefs on the basis of other means of justification, such as percep-
tion or testimony. These are not sources of fundamental non-natural
information, and so they will not count as the reference-fixing modes of
justification. Only the outputs of rational insight count as fixing the
content, and so the non-naturalist who holds such a view doesn’t need to
worry that beliefs will converge on some natural property.⁶² There is also no
risk that the means of justification will converge on the wrong normative
property: Part of what makes it the case that WRONGNESS targets
wrongness, as opposed to, say, goodness, is that the means of justification
make beliefs containing WRONGNESS non-luckily true, which can only
be explained by WRONGNESS referring to wrongness.⁶³
7.5. HOW THE EPISTEMIC THEORY HELPS
THE NON-NATURALIST
My proposal is that the non-naturalist metasemanticist endorse Aboutness
and Justification, or something like it, read as a theory about content fixing
for (at least) our moral concepts. I think there are three important reasons
why the non-naturalist should find the epistemic theory of content attract-
ive. First, and most importantly, the epistemic theory explains how refer-
ence to non-natural normative properties is possible. This alone makes the
epistemic theory better suited for non-naturalist metasemantics than the
other views discussed above. Second, the epistemic theory helps to unify two
independent objections to non-naturalism—on the one hand, that non-
naturalists cannot explain how beliefs in non-natural properties are possible,
and on the other, how non-naturalist moral knowledge is possible. The
epistemic theory of content, if correct, would entail that a wholly adequate
non-naturalist epistemology would simultaneously rebut both metaseman-
tic and epistemological concerns for non-naturalism. And finally, the
⁶² As Gunnar Björnsson points out, it could turn out that the normative concepts refer
to natural properties on such a view, just in case there is some equally or more funda-
mental natural property that rational insight converges on. But that seems unlikely, at
least on a standard non-naturalist view according to which the normative properties are
fundamental (or close to it).
⁶³ Importantly, the theory of epistemic luck we endorse can’t itself make indispensable
use of the referent in question, on pain of circularity. Thanks to Aaron Elliott and Bar
Luzon for discussion here.
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epistemic theory is ideally placed to capture Autonomy and “just too
different” intuitions, the central motivations for non-naturalism in the
first place. I’ll briefly discuss each of these advantages in turn.
7.5.1. Non-Naturalism and the Epistemic Theory of Content
Virtually no non-naturalists are skeptics. So they’re committed to:
Moral Knowledge. Human beings have some non-accidentally true
justified moral beliefs.
Moral Knowledge entails that there is a source of justification for at least some
of our moral beliefs. There is some belief-forming method we have—in
Dickie’s phrase, a “means of justification”—that, if we’re not unlucky,
converges on truths about non-natural moral properties. Just what is this
means of justification?
Dickie, who is concerned with means of justification for ordinary objects,
discusses two potential means of justification: perception and testimony.⁶⁴
It’s possible for the non-naturalist to argue that these are the means of
justification for non-natural properties as well, but this has not been the
traditional approach of non-naturalists. What’s important is that the anti-
skeptical non-naturalist is committed to some proprietary means of justi-
fication. If their theory is plausible, it should turn out that in good cases
the means of justification results in non-luckily true beliefs, and thus that
the means of justification will, over time, converge on the non-natural
properties.
The fact that means of justification are only constrained by their tendency
toward truth is central to avoiding the problems of the previous externalist
metasemantic theories. Causal and teleological metasemantic theories are
ill-placed for the non-naturalist metasemanticist precisely because they
impose constraints on content-fixing that non-naturalist properties can’t
meet. Even if we have direct epistemic access to certain properties or
objects, on such views, so long as we aren’t causally or teleologically
related to these properties, we can’t form beliefs about them. An epistemic
theory of content can capture what’s good about these theories while
remaining agnostic about the possibility of referring to other properties.
Maybe we can’t non-accidentally track non-causal properties. But if we
can, only the epistemic theory of content can move us from this non-
accidental tracking to content fixing. This is just what the non-naturalist
needs. If the non-naturalist has an otherwise compelling theory of intuition,
⁶⁴ Dickie (2015).
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rational insight, or moral perception, then they have a mode of justification
that the epistemic theory of content can exploit to provide a metasemantics
for the non-natural properties.
7.5.2. Metasemantic and Epistemic Objections
to Non-Naturalism: One and the Same?
There may seem to be an obvious but deep problem with what’s been just
said. The epistemic theory of content is all well and good for domains where
we have a clear epistemology. But the moral domain is not one in which we
have a clear picture of how knowledge is possible. And the situation is
especially dire for non-naturalists, given Benacerraf-influenced arguments
and evolutionary debunking arguments, which try to show that non-
naturalism makes moral knowledge impossible. Isn’t appealing to the epi-
stemic theory of content trying to solve a difficult problem by reference to
an epistemological theory with an even more devastating problem?
I admit, there’s something ironic here in appealing to non-naturalist
epistemology to solve a problem for non-naturalism, given that epistemol-
ogy is one of the biggest sources of concern for such a view. However, as
noted above, the non-naturalist is already committed to there being some
solution to these problems. The epistemic theory of content only aims to
piggyback on whatever solution this might be, and use it to fix content onto
the non-natural properties. A wholly adequate non-naturalist epistemology
will already be committed to there being some means of justification that
non-luckily converges on the non-natural normative facts.⁶⁵ The epistemic
theory of content says that this is all that is needed to ensure that our moral
beliefs pick out the non-natural properties. So it follows from commitments
that the non-naturalist already has—controversial as they might be—that
the epistemic theory of content can provide a proper metasemantics for non-
natural normative beliefs.
Of course, none of this goes any of the way toward actually providing
a theory of justification for non-naturalism. Such a project is non-trivial,
but it is a task for the non-naturalist qua epistemologist, not qua metase-
manticist. And this is tentatively good news for the non-naturalist, for two
related reasons. First, it reduces two families of objections to non-natural-
ism—epistemic and metasemantic—to one. This means that, if it can be
done, a positive epistemological theory for non-naturalism could rebut two
potentially devastating sets of objections to non-naturalism in one fell
⁶⁵ This mode of justification also cannot presuppose that the metasemantic explanans
is already met. Thanks to Bar Luzon for pointing this out to me.
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swoop. Second, this is contingently good news for the non-naturalist given
the fact that much more work has been done on addressing non-naturalist
epistemology than on non-naturalist metasemantics. So the reduction of the
two families of objections into one has the fortuitous upshot of rendering
the success of non-naturalist metasemantics dependent on a problem that
has already received an overwhelming amount of attention and work.
Obviously, no consensus has emerged, even among those sympathetic to
non-naturalism, about how to solve these epistemological problems. But
there is hope.
7.5.3. Autonomy and the “Just Too Different” Intuition
Finally, the epistemic theory of content fits perfectly with the autonomy
claims, core motivations for non-naturalism. Recall Epistemological and
Metaphysical Autonomy:
Epistemological Autonomy. An agent could be wholly procedurally
rational and fully informed about all the natural facts and yet ignorant
or mistaken about the normative.
Metaphysical Autonomy. The normative facts are irreducible to the
natural facts, in the sense that there is no conceptual entailment or
complete metaphysical explanation from the natural facts to the nor-
mative facts.
We saw above that these claims cause problems for certain attempts to provide
a non-naturalist metasemantics. Non-naturalists claim that the metaphysical
gap, sometimes expressed in terms of the “just too different” intuition,
between natural facts and normative facts, is too wide to be crossed epistemo-
logically. An epistemology for the purely normative facts won’t be assisted by
gathering more non-normative facts. Our means of justification (in terms of
the source of input) for normative facts is going to have to be fundamentally
different from our means of justification for run of the mill natural facts, given
their metaphysical status as independent from them.
The epistemic theory of content nicely accommodates this line of think-
ing. To see why this is so, just recall from above that, for the non-naturalist,
the proprietary means of justification for normative beliefs will be unlike the
means of justification for their natural counterparts.⁶⁶ This fits perfectly
⁶⁶ Not all non-naturalists accept this claim (e.g. Seitya 2012), myself included,
ironically (Werner 2016, 2018). But most do, and I think even those who do not accept
that the sentence in the text is strictly true have reason to accept a variant of it so long as
they’re committed to Metaphysical Autonomy.
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with the line of thinking behind the Autonomy Theses. The Autonomy
Theses are preserved, and thus the core motivation for non-naturalism is
preserved—even explained in part—by the epistemic theory of content.
A similar explanation will hold for any non-naturalist theory that aims to
capture Epistemological Autonomy.
7.6 . CONCLUSION
Non-naturalists have done a great amount of work on the metaphysics and
epistemology of irreducibly normative properties. Considerably less work
has been done on their metasemantics. This is surprising, because many of
the traditional metasemantic views rule out the possibility of referring to
and having beliefs about non-natural properties. Thus an underexplored
objection to non-naturalism remains unsolved. Non-naturalists may have
believed that they could help themselves to other realist-friendly metase-
mantics for normative terms. The first goal of this chapter was to argue
that that is mistaken: None of the traditional metasemantic theories, even
those explicitly given to be realist-friendly, fit with non-naturalism, espe-
cially given considerations surrounding the Autonomy Theses. Thus, the
pessimistic half of this chapter argued that non-naturalists really do face a
metasemantic challenge.
My second goal in this chapter defended a sketch of a positive metase-
mantic view, indebted to recent work by Imogen Dickie. On this view, what
makes a given normative concept refer to a non-natural property is that its
means of justification converge onto the facts that the property figures in.
The view has powerful independent motivation. Furthermore, it avoids the
problems that other metasemantic theories cause for non-naturalists, as well
as according nicely with some of the central motivations for non-naturalism.
The success of this theory of content at explaining how our normative
beliefs pick out the non-natural properties depends on providing an
adequate epistemology for non-naturalism. Since this task is notoriously
difficult, non-naturalists are not out of the woods. If the epistemic theory
defended above is correct, then, defending a positive epistemology for non-
naturalism is even more urgent. If it can be done, the non-naturalists will
have made a significant amount of progress, not just epistemologically, but
metasemantically as well.⁶⁷
⁶⁷ Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to unpack the reasoning in the
following Appendix.
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APPENDIX
Aboutness and Justification: Dickie’s Arguments
In the main body of the chapter, I claimed that
Aboutness and Justification: S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs are about an object o
iff their means of justification converges on the object, so that, given
how the beliefs are justified, the subject will be unlucky if they do not
match the object and not merely lucky if they do.
is entailed by the following two principles:
Aboutness and Truth: “A thought about an object (a thought attrib-
uting a property to an object) is true iff the object has the property.”⁶⁸
Truth and Justification: “Justification is truth-conducive: in general,
and allowing exceptions, if a subject’s belief is justified, he or she will
be unlucky if the belief is not true and not merely lucky if it is.”⁶⁹
But the proof here is not at all obvious. I here briefly walk through the proof of the
biconditional; my discussion in this appendix is heavily indebted to Dickie’s own
discussion.⁷⁰
Begin with the left-to-right conditional. The proof here is straightforward.
Suppose
1. S’s belief that <a is ɸ> is about o.
From 1 and Aboutness and Truth, we get:
2. S’s belief that <a is ɸ> is true iff o is ɸ.
From 2 and Truth and Justification, it follows that:
3. Justification that renders S’s belief that <a is ɸ> unlucky if false
and not merely lucky if true will make it the case that S’s belief is
unlucky if o is not ɸ.
Which thereby gives us the left-to-right conditional:
4. If S’s <a is ɸ> belief is about o, justification that renders S’s belief
that <a is ɸ> unlucky if false and not merely lucky if true will make it
the case that S’s belief is unlucky if o is not ɸ.
⁶⁸ Dickie (2015: 37).
⁶⁹ Dickie (2015: 38). This is Dickie’s approximate formulation of the principle, but
the precise details are outside the scope of this chapter.
⁷⁰ Dickie (2015: ch. 2).
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Let’s turn, then, to the right-to-left conditional. Here things get trickier. Here is the
conditional to be proven:
RtL Aboutness and Justification: If the proprietary means of justifica-
tion for S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs converge on some object o, such that S will
be unlucky if they do not match o and not merely lucky if they do,
then S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs are about o.
One reason the proof of this side of the conditional is trickier is that we need to rule
out two alternatives to establish that S’s <a is ɸ> beliefs are about o. First, it may be
that S’s beliefs are about some other object, o*. Second, it may be that S’s beliefs are
about nothing at all—they may have no referent. Let’s consider each in turn.
How can we rule out that S’s beliefs are about some other object, o*? In order for
this to be so, we would need two objects, o and o*, such that all of their intrinsic and
relational properties—or at least all of them accessible via the proprietary means of
justification—are the same. In the case of ordinary objects, at least, this simply won’t
happen, because some of the relational properties of o and o* have to do with their
relations to the believing agent herself. And barring spatiotemporally overlapping
intrinsic duplicates, this won’t happen.⁷¹ Now this reasoning only works for ordin-
ary, physical objects, whereas in the chapter, I am concerned with non-natural
properties. So a question can be raised about why one’s normative beliefs may not
be about some other property, F*, such that F (the genuinely normative property) is
not identical to F*. But in the case of properties, I submit that it is just impossible for
there to be two distinct properties which share all of the same features, and so the
problem just doesn’t arise. It is true that there may be some natural property F*
which is extensionally equivalent to F, but F would still, assuming non-naturalists are
right, have some second-order features that F* does not.
The second possibility is that, while S’s proprietary means of justification con-
verges on o, her beliefs are nonetheless about nothing. She has failed to secure
reference because, presumably, there is some other condition on fixing reference
that she has not met. This alternative is less plausible on its face. We would need
some powerful argument to the effect that, even though S’s beliefs consistently and
non-coincidentally track facts about o, nonetheless her beliefs are not about o. And it is
hard to imagine how such an argument would go.
I wholly realize that the above arguments leave some space for disagreement and
rebuttal. But I hope to have done a good job of motivating the view without getting
too far afield from the present project, which is to assume that Dickie’s theory is,
broadly speaking, correct, and to show how it can be extended to non-naturalist
metasemantics.⁷²
⁷¹ See Dickie (2015: ch. 2) for detailed reasoning along these lines.
⁷² For extremely helpful feedback and discussion on earlier drafts, I’m thankful to John
Bengson, Gunnar Björnsson, Teresa Bruno Niño, Janice Dowell, Billy Dunaway, Kevan
Edwards, Aaron Elliott, David Enoch, Nikki Fortier, Zoë Johnson King, Avi Kenan,
W. Scott Looney, Bar Luzon, Hille Paakkunainen, Caleb Perl, Jared Riggs, Mark
Schroeder, and Byron Simmons.
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